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Abstract
The Hotelling rule is applied to the case of a fixed CO2 budget restriction
which has to be met in order to reach the global warming goal according to
the Paris Agreement. While the theoretical result is well-known and simple,
the practical implementation under technological uncertainty suggests that
tradable emission certificates are superior to CO2 taxes. The practical imple-
mentaion has also to consider that production chains are globalized, and that
decarbonization strategies will be pointless if the Global South is not part of
it.
Keywords: climate change; CO2 reduction, Hotelling rule, CO2 taxes,
emission trading system, globalization
JEL Classification: Q54, Q58, Q30, Q37, Q38, O30
1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement is a broad consensus that global warming should not exceed
1.5 (maximum: 2) degree Celsius. As the global temperature is a function of the
total stock of emitted greenhouse gases, this goal implies that the remaining amount
of CO2 (and equivalents) which is allowed to being emitted, is restricted: so-called
“CO2 budget”. As we can interpret the absorbing capacity of the biosphere as a
resource input for production, we can use the Hotelling result how to maintain in-
finite production with a non-renewable resource (Hotelling 1931). It is a normative
approach of the intertemporally efficient use of a finite resource. The main difference
is that the non-renewable resource is a private good with a price, while emissions are
an externality. Moreover, the Hotelling rule is based on the fact that the technology
and preferences are given and do not change through time. Thus, the result is not di-
rectly applicable to real-world. Nevertheless, the Hotelling path where permanently
increasing resource prices induce a permanent substitution by factors which could be
accumulated is a sort of blueprint for implementing decarbonization policies under
more realistic conditions which are addressed in this paper.
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2 Hotelling and the decarbonization path
The discussion starts with the interpretation of the aggregated production func-
tion. Such a function is a (very debatable) representation of the entire production
apparatus of the economy, consisting of many different technologies in various sec-
tors. Leaving the important and fruitful Cambridge-Cambridge controversy aside
(Pasinetti/Scazzieri 1987), we concentrate on two issues: (a) in some sectors we
have already backstop technologies which do not depend on fossil inputs, such like
renewable energies for producing electricity. (b) In some sectors a substitution with
non-fossil technologies is difficult or even impossible at the current state. We assume
that this could be represented by a partial substitutability of fossil technologies with
non-fossil ones. Substitution does not necessarily mean that we produce exactly the
same physical bundle of goods with different inputs, but to obtain the same GDP
with different technologies which might imply structural change (de-linking output
from environmental input). Non-fossil (“clean”) technologies require investments
into a capital stock K, while the existing fossil technologies require the use of na-
ture as a sink for CO2 emissions, E. Investments into fossil technologies as well as
labor are neglected for sake of simplicity.
Thus, we assume Y = F (K,E) with the usual properties of positive but declining
marginal returns, partial substitutability, and constant returns to scale. A decar-
bonization strategy means that more and more fossil technologies are replaced by
“clean” ones, which implies a permanent substitution of E by K.The CO2 budget
is given by B. Utility comes from consumption only2, u = u(C). The optimization






with β ∈ (0, 1) as the discount factor, subject to
K˙(t) = F (K(t), E(t))− C(t)
B˙(t) = −E(t)
and B(t) ≥ 0 and K(t) > 0 for all t. Regarding the global warming goal, the
compliance with the CO2 budget, here: B(t) ≥ 0 ∀t, is the crucial condition. From




FK is the real return of “clean” capital, or in case of competitive markets: it’s real
interest rate. However, it is not clear whether a price of emissions, i.e. a price
according to the marginal productivity FE, exists. Emissions are an externality,
unlike the resources in the original Hotelling model which are traded on markets.
So the result of the Hotelling rule implies – given that we have a market economy
instead of a central planner – that emissions have to be priced according to their
2In addition, it might also be negatively affected by the emissions E, see Xepapadeas 2015.
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marginal (social) cost which means that we have to internalize the external cost,
which prompts for governmental action. Without such a price, emissions will main-
tain or even increase which will induce immense losses of wealth in the future once
when the 1.5 degree goal isn’t accomplished. In order to induce a permanent substi-
tution of fossil technologies with clean ones, the emission price has to permanently
rise with the rate FK according to the Hotelling rule. Technically, this works with
a substitution elasticity of at least one. For the next years or even decades this
should be not very problematic as we have backstop technologies in many (but not
all) CO2 emitting industries which allow for complete substitution.
We should keep in mind that this is a normative model which depends on quite
harsh simplifying assumptions. In particular, we have one well-defined function F
with properties which do not change in time. This is unrealistic. The underlying
production apparatus is permanently changing due to technical progress and tech-
nical adjustments. Moreover, we neither have perfectly competitive markets which
guarantees that factors are priced according to marginal productivity, nor do we
have a perfect internalization strategy for pricing E. But the overall message, that
emissions have to decline and being substituted by clean technologies such that
B(t) ≥ 0 for all t holds true, and that therefore the emission price must somehow
rise, is still highly plausible. This take-home message from the Hotelling model is
an important advice.
3 Practical implementation: CO2 taxes or ETS?
A carbon tax per ton CO2 and year is an instrument which is used by several coun-
tries (e.g. Sweden, UK, Switzerland, South Africa, see World Bank/Ecofys 2016).
It is relatively easy to implement on a national level. Although it is easy to design
a scheme with permanently rising prices (as done in most of the countries), the
absolute level is also considering the negative effects on the price-competitiveness of
fossil-intensive domestic industries, and are thus an outcome of political bargaining.
A policy maker could observe whether the development of past CO2 emissions de-
clined such that it is consistent with the Paris Agreement, or in other words: that
it is likely not to exceed the budget constraint B(t) ≥ 0. If the substitution process
is too slow, CO2 taxes have to rise stronger. The problem is that the policy maker
neither has the full picture of the production apparatus behind F (K,E), i.e. the
substitution elasticities, nor about the innovative change of the technologies and
practices. That means that the price path is politically determined but the emission
path is an endogenous and uncertain outcome. This is problematic as B(t) ≥ 0∀t is
absolutely mandatory. Another problem regarding internalization of external cost
is that in case of a small country the marginal effect on global warming is close
to zero, even in case of total decarbonization3. We do not have an idea about the
“correct” national price of CO2 emission if not all countries are strictly committed
to the Paris Agreements and implement policies accordingly.
3Germany contributes 2.4% to global CO2 emissions. In case of a sudden stop of German carbon
emissions (100% reduction), this would be globally statistically insignificant as China, India and
US have still growing emissions.
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Another internalization strategy which is used for several branches e.g. in the Eu-
ropean Union or in the United States is the Emission Trading System (ETS). Pur-
chasing a license for CO2 emissions per year is costly. This requires that the initial
offering of the certificates by the governmental authorities is costly, too, e.g. by using
an auctioning mechanism4. The license can be traded such that in case of competi-
tive markets the substitution of fossil with clean technologies takes place at lowest
cost. Only firms with high cost of avoiding emissions will hold certificates. The ab-
solute amount of tradable certificates is fixed and declines each period. Henceforth
it is possible to choose a path similar to the Hotelling path and to achieve B(t) ≥ 0
for all t for sure. Whether this path is optimal (according to the Hotelling rule)
is unclear for the same reasons mentioned above: the price for certificates might
fluctuate, and the price-quantity path is unlikely to meet the optimality conditions
all the time. However, the absolute boundary of the CO2 budget is respected for
sure. The policy maker could learn from past price movements whether at the cur-
rent state a substitution became easier or not. E.g. in case of price stagnation or
declines we obviously have reached a technological level which makes substitution
easier. Henceforth, in the next period the policy maker could cut the certificate
amount even more.
Under ideal conditions, i.e. well-known function F and competitive markets, both
solutions could be designed such that they are equivalent. However, given the lack of
knowledge about the production apparatus and the permanent technological change,
the ETS solution is more favorable in terms of precisely targeting the ecological goals.
Regarding the implementation, both strategies have their caveats if we consider an
open economy which is embedded in global value chains and trade patterns.
Both strategies will lead to an additional governmental income, either in form of
CO2 taxes or revenues from initially selling certificates. Decarbonization is a mega-
trend which will massively change the way of producing goods and services, and all
that has to be managed in quite short time. Therefore, both pricing strategies will
lead to tremendous additional expenditures of households which many of them will
not be able to afford. As the purpose of both policies is to change the relative prices
in order to spur the substitution process towards decarbonization, these additional
governmental income should be given back to the households directly and immedi-
ately, preferably in a lump-sum transfer so that it does not distort allocation. So we
should see only the substitution effect due to relative price changes, but not negative
income effects. The disposable aggregated household income should be unchanged.
As poor and rich households have different consumption patterns, economists expect
also positive redistributive effects from such an appropriate pricing-transfer scheme
(see Edenhofer/Schmidt 2018).
Some countries implement both systems (World Bank/Ecofys 2016), that is they
participate in an ETS for particular industries and branches plus having a carbon
tax. This might be suitable if the necessary extension of an ETS to all sectors is
difficult because it requires supranational adjustments, while the domestic decar-
bonization should be spurred also in the short-run. One problem is, that due to the
4The so-called “grandfathering” of allocating certificates is one of the most criticized inconsis-
tencies of the European ETS, see Clo` 2010.
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existence of parallel systems there is no unique price for CO2 in the economy, and
eventually some branches might pay a double price. All that create inefficiencies.
However, it could be the second-best if the alternative is to do nothing.
4 International issues
Each environmental policy measure or decarbonization strategy on a national level
necessarily changes the relative prices, i.e. makes fossil-intensive activities relatively
more expensive. If these domestic industries lose price-competitiveness, and the
country loses comparative advantages for producing this good or task, the global
production chains will re-arrange, and the fossil-intensive production moves to other
countries (“Carbon Leakage”). The effect on reducing global CO2 emissions might
thus be zero or even negative. This underlines that a global externality (or making
policies in favor of a global commons) is a public good and results in inefficient
Nash equilibria. The Paris Agreement should provide a solution, however, it is not
reinforcable and thus imposes weak incentives. Any decarbonization strategy should
keep in mind that the vast share of future CO2 emission comes from developing
and emerging countries which are growing rapidly (Busch 2015; note that the vast
majority of past accumulated emissions stem from Europe and the US). A purely
national decarbonization strategy is pointless if it is not considering this fact. On the
other hand, higher CO2 prices in developed countries might also spur technological
innovations towards greener production as there is an incentive to save expensive
inputs. Henceforth, an economy might eventually benefit from a technologically
leading position, at least if other countries also adopt decarbonization policies (see
Porter/van der Linde 1995).
A first answer to this problem is to impose Border Carbon Adjustment taxes (BCA)
in order to establish a playing level field. The correction of relative prices (due
to internalization) should not harm the domestic industry or create benefits for
countries with a lax climate policy. Also the BCA revenues should be immediately
returned to the households in order to avoid negative income effects. In case of CO2
taxes, the BCA should be at the same level – minus carbon related taxes or emission
licence fees the exporting firm might have paid in foreign countries (avoiding double
taxation). It is essential to note that BCA are not tariffs, and they are not distorting
competition but establishing fair competition. Thus, they are conform with WTO
rules (Mehling et al. 2017).
To some extent it might be possible to “export” the decarbonization strategy by
setting incentives to adopt similar policy schemes in other countries. While BCA
might be a mild incentive to implement carbon prices in the foreign country, too, in
order avoid BCA payments, the instrument of production standards can be used as
well. Usually (high) standards are seen as protectionist measures. But in most cases
the purpose is clearly not to prevent foreign firms to export their goods but reasons
of environmental or consumer protection, labor standards etc., which means: rea-
sons rooted in externality or information asymmetry problems of market allocation.
In case of climate change, all countries share a common interest to shape the rules of
economic activities such that carbon emissions are reduced, although there might be
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different national strategies how to implement it. Standards which aim to protect
the biosphere, a global commons, instead of the domestic industry should be ac-
ceptable. Therefore, standards should facilitate fair and efficient market exchange,
national and cross-border, and should thus not be seen as a barrier to (efficient)
trade. Defining decarbonization standards in a general manner might be an instru-
ment to promote such policies in other countries. These standards could range from
reporting the carbon footprint of the product or service (via the entire production
chain), or enforcing that at least 50% of the BCA have to be reduced by foreign
carbon prices, guaranteeing low carbon production by using green technologies etc.
Such standards could be made more acceptable for poor countries if also an easier
access to knowledge and clean technologies is provided at the same time.
Another form of “exporting the decarbonization strategy” is to facilitate global
diffusion of best practice green technologies. Instead of making most private profit
of developing green technologies in the Global North, it is essential to make the
highest social profits by promoting the adoption of these technologies in the Global
South. Now and in the future, large-scale CO2 reductions could be achieved in
emerging countries. This requires massive investments from the Global North.
Finally, the instrument of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) should be based on joint
decarbonization goals. This means that the Sustainable Development Goals of the
UN as well as the Paris Climate Agreement should not just be mentioned in FTAs
(“for kind attention”) but being the basis of it. Trade easing such like reducing
tariffs or harmonizing standards are strictly conditional to rigorous and enforced
environmental standards and implemented policies in all participating countries in
order to reach joint environmental goals. This might include the provision of tech-
nological knowledge how to achieve a greener production (see above). It is not a
wise strategy to disentangle trade policy and environmental policy because sustain-
able production and trade necessarily requires that ecological conditions (“planetary
boundaries”) are met. Because national environmental policy efforts are threatened
by the global free-riding problem, it is essential to address these problems in trade
agreements. Unfortunately, even the recent examples of FTA such like between
the EU and the Mercosur countries most agreements follow the traditional route
of kindly mentioning environmental and social goals in a general manner (without
much enforcement), followed by particular trade alleviations which ignore the condi-
tionality on sustainability goals5. This might have something to do with the question
who is participating in the trade negotiations. But without a substantial change of
the FTA towards the conditionality on ecological goals such like decarbonization,
national policies of the Global North will have moderate or low global impact. The
atmosphere doesn’t mind where, how and why CO2 emissions are reduced as long
as the reduction is sufficient to prevent overheating.
5Example: Reducing import tariffs on agricultural products from Brazil to zero if and only if
the rainforest is protected. In case of substantial grubbing, the tariffs will automatically rise to
XX %. A very small step towards this direction was done by pushing Brazil’s president Bolsonaro
to stay with the Paris Agreement in exchange to participation with the EU-Mercosur-FTA.
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5 Conclusion
In order to meet the Paris Agreement it is essential not to exceed the CO2 budget.
The safest way is to implement an ETS where all sectors have to participate with-
out any exception. The strategy to cut the yearly amount of available certificates
could be triggered by the development of the observed prices. Hence it might come
– more or less – close to the optimality conditions of the Hotelling rule. A CO2
tax (or a mixed system) is also a good policy option but seen as second-best. The
main problem is the unpredictability of technological changes so that the substi-
tution path cannot be controlled properly. Both decarbonization strategies have in
common that they generate income of the fiscal budget which should be directly and
immediately returned to the households in order to avoid negative income effects.
Another important issue is that national decarbonization strategies are limited by
globalization: in order to achieve level playing field and to avoid that dirty indus-
tries move to other countries with lax policies, Border Carbon Adjustment taxes
(or similar measures) are necessary. But globalization could also be a chance rather
than hindrance: defining environmental standards which have to be met across
the entire global production chain as an import requirement, and using Free Trade
Agreements by making trade alleviations conditional to such policies, could promote
decarbonization policies in other countries.
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